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THE EFFECTIVE USE OF WAR STORIES IN TEACHING EVIDENCE
MICHAEL L. SEIGEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Deans and Associate Deans for Academic Affairs get them all the time:
letters from usually very successful senior practitioners, often alumni of the
law school, seeking either a full time tenure-track teaching position or offering
to teach a course or two as an adjunct. The former letters are normally
dismissed out of hand: those of us who toil in academia are not keen on the
perception, demonstrated by these applicants, that law teaching is a profession
into which one decides to "retire." Usually, by discussing the scholarship
requirements expected of full time faculty members and the pressures of
acquiring tenure, it is not a difficult task to dissuade these (often burnt-out)
practitioners that the teaching profession is not exactly what they had in mind
for their senior years. On the other hand, offers by experienced lawyers to
share their wealth of knowledge with law students by teaching an adjunct
course in their field of expertise are far more intriguing. If the subject matter is
an area of interest to the school and is not already being taught by existing
faculty, these offers often get a hard look. After all, adjuncts are never in it for
the money, and thus good ones can add a great deal of value to the curriculum
for little cost. They also provide an excellent bridge between academia and the
practicing bar.
The main worry about hiring an experienced attorney as an adjunct
professor is the fear that the adjunct will rely too heavily on "war stories" to
teach. I Whether correct or not, law school administrators do not consider a
class consisting primarily of the reminiscences of a successful lawyer about
"the glory days" to be a worthwhile pedagogical experience. Although a bit of
this concern may stem from academic snobbery, most law faculty would agree
that effective teaching requires students to be engaged as active learners both
inside the classroom and out. Listening to story after story-some perhaps not
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. For purposes of this Essay, my definition of a "war story" is quite simple. It is the
retelling of an event from the teacher's experience as a practicing lawyer to illustrate a point in
the classroom. The uses of war stories range from the minimal-a few sentence recitation by the
professor-to the extensive-requiring students to read documents from the professor's practice
prior to class to set up a lengthy classroom discussion covering a wide range of issues.
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even particularly relevant to the topic at hand-is the polar opposite of active
learning. Even though a practitioner might not initially decide to teach through
the "war story method," she might be tempted to do so after realizing the
difficulty of the Socratic method. Especially for a new teacher, anything
resembling Socratic teaching requires many hours of preparation for each hour
of class, along with significant pedagogical skill in the classroom itself.
Storytelling is so much easier. And besides, she was hired to share her
accumulated wisdom and knowledge with the students, was she not?
Thus, the telling of war stories has garnered something of a bad name in
academia.2  It is right down there with "lecturing" and "spoon-feeding"-
simply not the way American law professors are expected to teach. Although I
agree with the general skepticism toward non-Socratic methods of law
teaching, I have nevertheless come to believe that, in the right classes and at
the right times, the judicious use of war stories by a professor can be a highly
valuable pedagogical tool.3 Done well, an effective war story can add to a
professor's credibility in class; it can drive a point home in a way that almost
no other teaching technique can achieve. War stories, told at key moments and
for good reason, can provide students with a sense of what it feels like to be a
lawyer in the real world. They can also be used to expand upon the application
of doctrine already taught, or to add an ethical dimension to the study of law in
any substantive class.4
Of course, there are certain prerequisites to the use of war stories in
teaching. First, the professor must, of course, have some experience in the
practice of law upon which to draw. 5 My own experience stems from ten years
2. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law
School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705, 781-82 (1998)
(noting that many in the academy scorn "'war stories' and for good reason. Used improperly,
they can waste time and take the place of hard thinking by both professor and student.").
3. I also agree with Professor John Kip Cornwell that "spoon-feeding" is a pejorative label
placed on good teaching when used under appropriate circumstances. See John Kip Cornwell,
Teaching Criminal Law, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1167, 1167 (2004) ("Clarity of explanation,
described by some commentators as the most important requisite of effective teaching, is
sometimes mislabeled 'spoon-feeding' by some law faculty who dismiss it accordingly. Nothing
could be further from the truth.").
4. Professor Schiltz agrees with my ultimate assessment as to the utility of war stories,
when properly employed. See Schiltz, supra note 2, at 782 (explaining that, if used carefully, war
stories can be "marvelous teaching tools").
5. Actually, even this seemingly obvious point is not altogether true. Sometimes, a teacher
can borrow the war story of another. One of my colleagues who also teaches Evidence uses my
Scarfo memo, filed in the jury trial of the case United States v. Scarfo, 711 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D.
Pa. 1989), see infra note 13 and accompanying text, to teach relevance and prejudice in the same
way that I do, attributing the materials and stories to me, of course. He (and a number of his
students) have reported to me how much they enjoy making use of this connection to the personal
experience of another member of the faculty.
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as a federal prosecutor, the first five (prior to teaching) spent trying organized
crime cases in Philadelphia, and the second five (after achieving tenure as a
law professor and taking a leave of absence) spent as the First Assistant United
States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. Second, the course must be
one that lends itself to the integration of theory and doctrine with the practical
application thereof. For example, in my first semester Criminal Law course I
almost never use war stories; the course is too focused on the basics of reading
cases, learning doctrine, and developing the analytical skills to "think like a
lawyer." In that class, telling stories from my prosecutor days would be an
indulgent waste of time: the students are not yet ready to benefit from forays
into the practical aspects of lawyering.6  I'm sure that war stories are
inappropriate in many other courses as well. For example, they are probably of
limited use in Constitutional Law, where the concepts and doctrinal intricacies
of Supreme Court precedent are of critical importance, and stories about the
practical application of such doctrine would amount to little more than
pontificating about appellate practice.
Evidence, however, is a subject in which the judicious use of war stories
by an experienced litigator can truly bring the class to life. Evidence is the
"law of the courtroom"; by its very nature, it is a truly practical subject. The
theory behind the rules of evidence-obtaining accurate verdicts,
accommodating for the use of an adversary system and lay jury, attempting to
achieve outcomes based on rational thinking as opposed to prejudice and
emotion, and pragmatic considerations such as not wanting to waste time-are
very straightforward and easily grasped by students. The difficult parts of the
law of evidence are twofold: (1) the very complex theoretical issue of what
constitutes hearsay; and (2) the use of and interrelationship among the
multitude of evidentiary rules in the practical setting of an adversarial
proceeding, typically conceived of as a jury trial. It is in this latter realm that
war stories can be extremely helpful; if done well, they draw students mentally
into the courtroom where critical evidentiary decisions are made. By
providing context, they can make an incomprehensible rule relevant and clear.7
Moreover, faculty without real war stories to tell can make up stories to suit their
pedagogical needs. One Evidence professor has gone so far as to develop extensive narratives
about the life of John Henry Wigmore-based, at least in part, on historical fact-to assist in
teaching the subject. See, e.g., Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Evidence: Storytelling in the
Classroom, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 453 (1992). Similarly, a Criminal Law professor describes how he
uses stuffed animals to create memorable scenes in the classroom to drive home important
doctrinal points. See Cornwell, supra note 3, at 1173.
6. Cf Joshua Dressier, Criminal Law, Moral Theory, and Feminism: Some Reflections on
the Subject and on the Fun (and Value) of Courting Controversy, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1143, 1150
(2004) ("Teachers of IL courses know that a primary goal of any first-year class is to teach
lawyering skills ('thinking like a lawyer').").
7. An earlier symposium on Evidence teaching a few years back led to an interesting
exchange of articles between Judge and Senior Lecturer Richard A. Posner and Professors Roger
2006]
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LA W JOURNAL
Thus, this Essay defends and discusses the use of war stories in the
Evidence classroom. 8 It sets out a series of "guidelines" for the effective use
C. Park and Richard D. Friedman on the optimal pedagogical methodology for an Evidence
course. See e.g., Richard A. Posner, Clinical and Theoretical Approaches to the Teaching of
Evidence and Trial Advocacy, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 731 (2003); Roger C. Park, Posner on
Teaching Evidence, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 741 (2003); Richard D. Friedman, A Resident of
Evidenceland Defends His Turf, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 753 (2003). In his essay, Posner
describes and promotes as ideal an Evidence class he teaches to a maximum of 30 students using
NITA materials and trial simulation "because I was persuaded that the subject could not be taught
successfully by the usual method of law teaching .. " Posner, supra, at 732. "I think (no
stronger word is possible) the students get a better grounding in the law of evidence than they
would if they studied it as a soon-to-be forgotten typical upper-class law school offering...
[w]hat they need to know is not the rules as such but, precisely, what goes on in a
courtroom ... ." Id. at 734. Posner even analogizes knowing the rules of evidence and using
them as akin to knowing the rules of physics and riding a bicycle. Id. at 731.
Park disagrees with Posner and points out some of the obvious fallacies with Posner's
position. Park notes that, in the absence of in-class review of the pertinent cases and rules of
evidence, students are even more apt than usual to resort to canned outlines and other outside
materials to teach themselves the subject. Park, supra, at 742-43. Moreover, even if a simulation
course can be made to work for 30 students, the reality is that the basic Evidence class at most
schools has an enrollment of 100 students or more. A successful simulation-based course of this
size is nearly impossible. Id. at 746-47. Park points out that a case- or problem-method class,
with occasional variations in teaching style, is the method that he prefers. Id. at 746-50.
Professor Friedman states that Judge Posner's course sounds less like "Evidence" and
more like "Trial Practice for Students Who Have Not Taken Evidence." Friedman, supra, at 753.
Ironically, Friedman's main disagreement with Posner's approach is that, by teaching the rules of
evidence in too specific a context; rather than explicating all of the intricacies and policies
underlying a rule, "it is not always clear whether [the students] ha[ve] learned anything but a war
story." Id. at 754-55. Friedman's position is that Evidence should be taken first, followed by a
trial advocacy course for students interested in litigation. Id. at 754.
I agree with all of Professors Park's and Friedman's arguments refuting the wisdom of
Judge Posner's suggestion that the basic Evidence course be taught as a simulation. Indeed, I
would go further and say that the pedagogical move suggested by Posner would be downright
counterproductive. The flaws in Judge Posner's own bicycle analogy illustrate the absurdity of
his position. A child learning to ride a bicycle need never know anything about the law of
physics; balancing is an innate human ability once practiced. On the contrary, trial lawyers must
know the ins and outs of the rules of evidence in order to put them into practice. The best trial
lawyers are virtuosos in manipulating these rules. I agree with Friedman that teaching the rules
first, then teaching their practical use through a trial advocacy course, is the best way to provide a
proper foundation for a future trial lawyer.
That said, my argument about war stories to some degree bridges the gap between
Posner on the one hand and Park and Friedman on the other. When an Evidence professor tells a
war story following the guidelines set out herein, he can occasionally transport his students, at
least mentally, from classroom to courtroom--providing some of the practical elements Judge
Posner argues are missing from the typical Evidence course without sacrificing the depth of
learning advocated by Park and Friedman.
8. There is some debate among Evidence professors over whether the case or problem
method is the most efficacious way to teach the subject. See Calvin William Sharpe, Nuts and
Bolts for the New and Occasional Evidence Teacher, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 993, 994-95 (2003)
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of war stories, and in illustrating these guidelines, makes use of some of the
stories I tell every time I teach my Evidence course. Though the discussion is
not grounded in science---empirical or otherwise-it is based on my decade-
plus of experience teaching the course. And though I certainly make no claim
that I do everything right, I can safely represent that the most ubiquitous
comment on my teaching evaluations throughout the years has been something
akin to: "Great stories! Wish there were more!' 9
II. GUIDELINES FOR TELLING WAR STORIES
A. Use War Stories Sparingly and Only When Relevant
Any teaching technique that is overused loses its effectiveness. Telling
war stories certainly falls under this principle. Not every trivial point of
evidence needs to be illustrated with a story from practice; in most cases, the
result would be tedium due to the repetition inherent in storytelling and re-
telling. Moreover, the judicious use of war stories is necessary if only because
such recitation takes time, and overuse of this technique would certainly cut
into the ability to cover the material essential to a typical three- or four-credit
Evidence course. Finally, one must be certain that when a story is employed, it
directly illustrates the matter being taught. An off-point story is not only a
waste of time, but it can be confusing, as students work to make a connection
that doesn't exist.
B. Use War Stories to Set Up a Problem or to Illustrate a Point AFTER the
Class Has Struggled with the Interpretation and Application of the
Pertinent Doctrine or Rule
Most law professors agree that the most effective method of teaching legal
analysis and doctrine is by forcing students to grapple with the raw materials-
statutes, cases, rules, and regulations-on their own, discerning the answers (or
coming to the conclusion that there is no "correct" answer) to questions posed
to them by the teaching materials and by the professor in class.' 0 The use of
(surveying Evidence teachers and concluding that about half of them use the problem method, a
third use the case method, and the remainder do something else). I personally use the problem
method, but it is my contention that war stories can be effective in enhancing either a case- or
problem-oriented course.
9. I certainly do not want to suggest that Evidence cannot be successfully taught without
war stories; I am simply defending the view that if a law professor has practical experience, he
should make use of it in teaching Evidence, but use it wisely as discussed herein.
10. See Rogelio Lasso, From the Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the
Challenge of Teaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 14 (2002)
("Most law school professors use a methodology that consists of the teacher attempting to convey
a legal concept, including its doctrinal rules and legal analysis, by assigning students readings
from certain sections of a casebook. Professors expect students to learn from the readings and
2006]
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war stories should not circumvent this process. Instead, the stories should
either be set up as problems for the students to help solve, or as illustrations of
points the students have already encountered.
My first extended use of a war story in Evidence exemplifies this
guideline.11 Like most Evidence professors, I begin the course by teaching
basic relevance under Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 401 and 402, and then
follow this by introducing the students to the concept of prejudice, and the
need to balance probative value versus prejudice as set out in FRE 403. Using
the Mueller and Kirkpatrick casebook, 12 we grapple with cases, problems, and
text illustrating the basic meaning of relevance, the standard of logical
relevance, inductive logic, and the construction and use of inferences and
evidential hypotheses in articulating and arguing about basic relevance. Then
we engage FRE 403, examining the many reasons why even probative
evidence may be excluded: unfair prejudice (and what, exactly, that means),
confusion of the issues, and waste of time. Finally, we tackle the problems of
completeness (FRE 106) and conditional relevancy (FRE 104(b)).
It is only at this point, about a week into the course, that I assign the
students to read a Memorandum of Law filed during the 1988 jury trial of the
case United States v. Scarfo,13 along with a list of questions to consider. 14 One
of the questions informs the students that the memorandum was ghost-written
in the middle of the night by a very junior organized crime prosecutor who was
not a member of the Scarfo trial team, and it asks them to identify the ghost
writer. Of course, they all quickly realize that it was me.
15
Scarfo was a huge, multi-defendant mafia racketeering case prosecuted by
the Philadelphia Organized Crime Strike Force during my tenure there. One of
the racketeering counts alleged that Nicodemo Scarfo, who had gone on to
become the "boss" of the Philadelphia family of La Cosa Nostra, and another
demonstrate their grasp of doctrinal rules and critical analysis by engaging in some form of
pseudo-Socratic dialogue with the professor.").
11. I am compelled at this point to remind the reader that, because my personal courtroom
practice extended from 1985-90, most of the war stories I tell my class and that I recount in this
Essay are at least fifteen years old. I am certain that I have mis-remembered some of the details
of these incidents over the years. But the essence of every war story I tell is true, and the details
are simply not important to the impact the stories have on the class. I have not gone back for
purposes of writing this Essay to ensure that every detail of every story is perfectly accurate and I
apologize in advance for any inaccuracies contained herein.
12. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES
(5th ed. 2004).
13. 711 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
14. The full text of the memorandum and assignment is attached to this Essay as an
appendix, starting on page 1214.
15. I am lucky in that many of my trial experiences involved organized crime prosecutions.
The mafia connection never fails to garner the full attention of the vast majority of my students,
adding to the efficacy of the war stories I tell.
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defendant named Nicholas Virgilio, murdered a federal judge named Edwin
Helfant. 16 The murder weapon was recovered. In the early days of what
turned out to be a very long (multi-month) trial, the prosecution offered the
testimony of one Kenneth McNair. McNair testified that he recognized the
murder weapon: he once had owned it, and he had given it to a friend of his
named Joseph Palumbo. The defense vigorously objected to McNair's
testimony on the grounds of relevance and prejudice. The prosecution
responded with a proffer outside the hearing of the jury: it would later prove
that Joseph Palumbo's brother was John Palumbo, and that John Palumbo was
a mafia "associate" of Nicodemo Scarfo. McNair would also testify that, once
the F.B.I. started inquiring about the gun, Joe Palumbo asked him to lie about
whom he had given it to, a request with which McNair initially complied. On
the basis of this proffer, the judge allowed McNair to testify over the defense's
FRE 401 and 403 objections. 17
McNair was a hostile witness for the prosecution. Although he testified
about giving the gun to Joe Palumbo, he contradicted the prosecution's proffer
about Palumbo asking him to lie-claiming, instead, that it was his own idea.
At this point, the defense renewed its relevance and prejudice objections to all
of McNair's testimony. The judge immediately struck the testimony
concerning the lie, and took the renewed motion regarding the remainder of
McNair's testimony under advisement. He then recessed court for the day,
stating that he would issue a further ruling in the morning. He was clearly
upset with the prosecution for promising one thing and delivering another.
The trial team (composed of five prosecutors) came back to the office that
day very agitated. They wanted to file a written memorandum to justify
keeping McNair's testimony about the gun in the record. (They were willing
to concede the lack of relevance concerning the "lie," given McNair's
courtroom testimony.) But they also had a multitude of tasks to perform to get
ready for the next court day. They looked around the office for someone to
write the necessary memorandum. I do not recall if I volunteered or if my boss
volunteered me. In any event, I worked through the night, ultimately
16. I use this opportunity to explain to the students that, consistent with their portrayal in the
media, members of the American La Cosa Nostra usually do not kill judges and prosecutors
because it is not "rational" in a cost-benefit sense: prosecutors and judges are replaceable, making
their elimination fruitless. I foreshadow the hearsay rule by explaining to the students that the
same is not the case for critical witnesses, which is why there is a Witness Protection Program.
Judge Helfant was murdered because he allegedly agreed to fix a case at the request of the mafia
and then failed to follow through on his corrupt promise. U.S. v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1100
(3d Cir. 1990).
17. Thus, the telling of the war story has the added benefit of providing me an opportunity to
introduce the students to the procedure, countenanced by FRE 104(b) and 611, of allowing
testimony into evidence subject to later "tying up" based upon an attorney's proffer outside the
presence of the jury.
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producing the assigned memorandum on FREs 401 and 403.18 The legal
discussion in the memorandum is composed primarily of boilerplate language
about the low threshold of FRE 401's logical relevance test, along with
essentially bald assertions that the gun testimony was relevant and not unduly
prejudicial. 19 In fact, the relative shallowness of the memorandum's advocacy
increases its effectiveness as a teaching tool, because it does not address the
difficult questions posed by the situation the prosecutors faced. Thus, I can
call upon the students to do the heavy lifting in class.
The first thing I ask the students to do is articulate the evidential
hypothesis supporting the prosecution's position that McNair's gun testimony
is relevant. It turns out that this is not an easy task, and they spend significant
time struggling with this issue of simple relevance. Eventually, we establish
that the hypothesis is something like the following: "People connected to a
murder weapon are more likely to have committed the murder than people who
are not connected to the murder weapon. McNair's testimony 'connected'
Scarfo to the murder weapon. Therefore, McNair's testimony had some
(slight!) tendency to increase the probability that Scarfo was the murderer
compared to those others."
I then ask the students to help me chart on the board the chain of inferences
necessary to support this evidential hypothesis. This exercise drives home the
point that the word "connection" in the hypothesis actually covers up
significant weaknesses in the prosecution's theory of relevance. To make the
relevant connection, the jury is being asked to infer that Joe Palumbo gave the
gun to his brother John, and that John Palumbo gave the gun to his "associate"
Scarfo. I note that there will be no specific evidence presented on these points.
This allows me to steer the class to make the counter-relevancy arguments. It
also provides me with the opportunity to inquire whether the defense could
have used a different tactic to attack McNair's testimony. A sharp student
usually realizes that the defense, employing conditional relevancy under FRE
104(b), could have chosen to appear "eminently reasonable" by conceding that
McNair's testimony would be relevant if the prosecution were to meet the
condition(s) of proving that Joe gave the gun to John and that John gave it to
Scarfo. Since, as the defense well knew, the prosecution could not meet either
of these conditions, this tactic would have been an alternative route to the
exclusion of McNair's evidence. This discussion enables me to demonstrate
the strategic use of the elusive concept of conditional relevancy in real life.
18. I think this part of the story comforts my students, who know that they will soon be the
most junior lawyer in whatever setting they choose for practice. Everyone--even their
professors-started at the same place. If I could survive a surprise all-nighter as a novice
attorney, so too will they.
19. Again, see infra the appendix starting on page 1214.
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Next, I ask the students to articulate the "unfair prejudice" of McNair's
testimony claimed by the defense. Once again, it turns out that my war story
expands upon what the students have already learned, for it illustrates a more
subtle notion of prejudice than they have previously encountered. The
prejudice-if there is any-stems from the low probative value of the evidence
in the first place; the argument is that the jury will be confused and think,
months later in the jury room, that the connection between Scarfo and the
murder weapon must be stronger than it actually is. Through this example, the
students learn that any close FRE 401 question can be converted into a FRE
403 issue as well.
Finally, I direct the students' attention to footnote one in the memorandum.
This footnote sets out a lengthy explanation of the factual basis for the
prosecution's proffer concerning McNair's lying at Joe Palumbo's request, and
it contends that McNair's hostility to the government was the likely reason for
his surprise backpedaling on the witness stand. I remind the students that the
prosecution is not asking the court to reverse its ruling excluding McNair's
testimony about the lying.20 Then I pose this question: given the prosecution's
position, what is the purpose of the footnote? I go so far as to tell them that, in
reality, footnote one is the main reason why the memorandum was written and
filed in the first place.
Usually, the class is stumped. This provides me with the opportunity to
take what I call a "Professional Responsibility" moment in the classroom-the
first of many to come. 21 I explain to the students that a lawyer's credibility is
his or her most important asset in the courtroom. A lot of evidentiary rulings
will be close calls, and a ruling in either direction will be well within the
discretion of the trial court. When a lawyer has credibility-when he has
always accurately represented the facts and law to the judge and has conceded
points that he cannot or should not win-the judge will be inclined to listen
carefully to that lawyer when a close call needs to be made. On the other hand,
if a judge feels that she has been misled or betrayed by a lawyer, the judge will
not be willing to trust that lawyer's representations in the future. Proffers are a
critical part of this equation. Judges especially count on lawyers' evidentiary
proffers to be accurate; if they are not, the result could be a mistrial. In this
case, the prosecutors were extremely concerned that, only days into a very long
trial, they had lost significant credibility with the judge by misstating the
substance of McNair's testimony. They wanted to explain to the judge exactly
20. Actually, I usually ask the students to state the evidential hypothesis underlying the
relevancy of Palumbo's asking McNair to lie about the recipient of the gun. Then I ask them to
examine the relevance of McNair's actual courtroom testimony-that he lied of his own accord.
We conclude as a class that the relevance of the first story is very thin, and the relevance of the
latter is virtually non-existent.
21. Cf. Schiltz, supra note 2, at 779-80 (discussing the use of war stories in the pervasive
method of teaching ethics).
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what had happened so that he would not lose faith in them. That was the
essential purpose of footnote one.
Thus, my nearly infinitesimal role in the prosecution of Nicodemo Scarfo
provides the quintessential war story: one that recaps a week of learning in an
interesting and practical setting, and stretches the students' understanding of
evidentiary concepts already introduced.
C. Use War Stories to Keep the Doctrine Anchored in Reality
Sometimes a cold reading of the rules, even when supplemented by
problems and cases, can leave students with a misimpression about the trial
process. I find that this occurs early in the course when the students first
grapple with FRE 403. In teaching FRE 403, I talk about the fact-finding
process in the courtroom as one designed to be a "pseudoscientific enterprise"
in which rational thought is supposed to supplant emotion, passion, and
prejudice. This is, of course, true, but it does not present an accurate and
robust picture of our adversary system. In reality, a trial is in large part a battle
for the sympathy of the jury, and all good trial lawyers work very hard, within
the boundaries set up by the rules, to capture the hearts and minds of the jurors
every step of the way.
I illustrate this point with a war story from a racketeering homicide case I
co-tried as a young prosecutor. One of the homicide victims was an alleged
drug dealer-not the most sympathetic victim to have in a murder case.
22
Early in the trial, we needed to authenticate the handwriting of this victim on
an important note he wrote shortly before he was killed. I explain to the class
that anyone who recognizes a person's handwriting can authenticate it. I then
pose the question: whom do you think we called to the witness stand to make
the identification? Usually, one or more students shout out the right answer:
Mom. I explain to the class that, by calling the victim's mother to the witness
stand we made a powerful emotional statement and turned our drug dealer
victim into a real person-a loving mother's son-but, because she was a
perfectly acceptable authentication witness, there was nothing objectionable
about it.
D. Use War Stories to Expand upon the Doctrine Covered by Other
Materials in the Course
While students are desperately attempting to master "the law" as though it
were written in stone, many law professors see their role as prodding students
to understand law as an amorphous mass of existing doctrine that, subject to
experience and argument, is prone to constant and eternal growth,
development, and change. We try to challenge our students to apply "the law"
22. Even worse, the other murder victim was himself an alleged murderer and member of the
mafia.
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in new and unusual contexts, and sometimes to go even further: to imagine
what the law might look like if a shift in society's values took place. One
effective use of war stories can be to help students understand that the best
lawyers are creative, not complacent. This can be accomplished by describing
moments in one's practice when, hit with sudden (and rare) inspiration, the
teacher used the law in a new or, at least unusual, way.
Two examples from my teaching help illustrate this point. The biggest and
most notorious case I co-tried as an organized crime prosecutor was United
States v. Gambino,23 a Sicilian mafia heroin and cocaine smuggling case, and a
successor to the "Pizza Connection" case24 originally tried in the1980s by
future F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh. This seventeen-defendant prosecution
resulted in two jury trials lasting a total of about three months. The facts of the
case are nicely summarized in the district court opinion, cited above, denying
Francesco Gambino's motion for a judgment of acquittal, which I assign as
reading midway though the course. Not surprisingly, a number of my war
stories throughout the semester arise out of this case, resulting in continuity
through the course that students appear to appreciate.
The first time I reference the Gambino prosecution is after the class has
studied FRE 801(d)(1)(C), the provision that exempts prior out-of-court
identifications from exclusion by the hearsay rule. The basic reason for the
exemption is not difficult to grasp: in-court identifications are usually not very
probative, while a properly conducted out-of-court identification, such as one
made during a line-up or photo-spread, is. 26 Once the students understand the
contours of the exemption, I posit a situation I faced during the second
Gambino trial when a Sicilian witness named Salvatore Allegra testified
(through an interpreter) to the identification of an unindicted co-conspirator he
knew only as "I1 Pachionello"-in English, "The Little Fat Guy." Out of
court, shown a photo-spread, Allegra told an F.B.I. agent that I1 Pachionello
was a courier onto whom Allegra had strapped kilogram quantities of heroin
for transport, via commercial airliner, from Sicily to the United States. Allegra
stated that he was certain that the person in the picture was the heroin courier.
This was a critical identification for my case, because other witnesses would
positively identify I1 Pachionello as a person who delivered heroin in the
23. 728 F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
24. See generally U.S. v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989).
25. Fortuitously, Judge Bechtle's opinion dealt very directly and very well with the
interpretation of Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). See Gambino, 728 F. Supp. at
1152-58. I thus assign the Gambino opinion in lieu of Bourjaily itself.
26. Of course, this is much truer when the case has only one defendant who can easily be
picked out by where he is sitting in the courtroom. The in-court identification is much more valid
(and much hairier for the prosecution) in a multi-defendant case, especially when many of the
defendants are related, or at least are of the same ethnic heritage, and share some similarities in
appearance.
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United States to co-conspirators of Francesco Gambino. Thus, through
Allegra, I1 Pachionello connected certain important conspirators in the United
States to others in Sicily.
Like Kenneth McNair before him, Allegra was a relatively uncooperative
witness; he was unhappy with his treatment under witness protection. One
way he showed his discontent was by providing a tepid in-court identification
of (the picture of) I1 Pachionello. Allegra stubbornly refused to say that the
man in the picture was the person to whom he gave heroin for transport; rather,
he testified that the person in the photograph "looked like" I1 Pachionello, but
he could not be sure. When pressed, he said that the two had the same body
shape, i.e., both were little fat guys, which made him think they were one and
the same, but claimed to be uncertain.
At this point, I tell the students that I was extremely worried about the
weakness of Allegra's identification testimony and ask the students what
options I had to solidify it. Invariably, a student will volunteer that, pursuant
to FRE 801(d)(1)(C), I could have asked Allegra about his unambiguous out-
of-court identification of I1 Pachionello. I agree with the student that this was
an option, but one with serious flaws. Through this discussion, I introduce the
concept of impeaching one's own witness (which is, in effect, what I'd be
doing), and I note the reality that Allegra was likely to dig in his heels and
deny the certainty of his earlier identification, making matters even worse.
Thus, I tell the students, I rejected this option and Allegra was excused from
the witness stand.
I prompt the students for other suggestions. I urge them to parse FRE
801(d)(1)(C) as they ponder the problem. Usually, the students are
confounded. If so, I ask them whether I could call to the stand the F.B.I. agent
who had witnessed Allegra's out of identification to testify to Allegra's stated
certainty at the time. Many students react by saying no, the agent's testimony
would be classic hearsay: it would amount to a repetition of Allegra's out-of-
court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I then ask a
student to tick off the requirements of FRE 801(d)(1)(C) and compare them to
my situation. The requirements are: (1) "the declarant testifies at the hearing
or trial"-which Allegra did; (2) the declarant "is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement"-which Allegra was; and (3) "the statement is one
of identification of a person made after perceiving the person"-which
27Allegra's statement was as well. The students realize that, because of the
passive voice used in its final phrase, the rule does not appear to limit
testimony about an out-of-court identification to that of the declarant himself,
as long as the declarant does testify at some point.
I tell the students that although I had no cases at my disposal to support my
view, Judge Bechtle agreed with my interpretation of FRE 801(d)(1)(C) and
27. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(C).
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allowed the F.B.I. agent to testify. Later precedent supports this outcome.28
Indeed, as I point out to my students, this very situation is hypothesized-and
the answer is provided-in the notes regarding FRE 801(d)(1)(C) in the
Mueller and Kirkpatrick casebook.29  The significance of the note is
overlooked-until the war story has been told.
Through this exercise, the students learn not only about an unusual
interpretation of a hearsay exemption, but also about (1) the importance of
going back to the original source of law for definitive guidance on its meaning;
(2) the importance of reading legal texts with extreme care rather than taking
for granted what they say; and (3) the importance to creative and successful
lawyering of thinking "outside the box."
The second example of how I use a war story to challenge the students to
think creatively comes toward the end of the course when we are discussing
witness rehabilitation. In this regard, I am compelled to make two confessions
up front: first, this is my all-time favorite war story, as it reflects one of my
finest "seat of the pants" moments in the courtroom; and second, I set the story
up by stressing to the students, when we are covering FRE 608(a)-the rule
that permits a party to call a character witness to testify to the truthful character
of an earlier witness whose credibility has been attacked "by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise"3 -- that FRE 608(a) is almost never used in
real life. At least in my experience, most attorneys do not believe that calling a
"good character witness" is likely to be of much assistance in restoring the
credibility of a witness who has been attacked; correctly, in my opinion, they
believe that this would simply cause the case to devolve into a hopeless
swearing contest. I tell the students that, in my five years of active trial
practice, I had never seen FRE 608(a) invoked.
Later, after we've covered the case in the book dealing with FRE 608(a),31
I end the unit on rehabilitation with this war story. The very last trial of my
career in Philadelphia was a tax case involving a husband and wife, Richard
and Suzanne C. 32 who owned a company that manufactured the steak meat
used in "Philly cheese steaks." I had indicted Richard and Suzanne for tax
28. See State v. Chinn, 709 N.E. 2d 1166, 1178-79 (Ohio 1999).
29. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, at 182.
30. FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
31. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, at 582-89 (reprinting United States v.
Medical Therapy Sciences, 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)). The casebook utilizes United States v.
Medical Therapy Sciences to demonstrate the lines of cross-examination that constitute a
sufficient attack on the credibility of a witness such that the party calling the witness may call a
rehabilitative witness under FRE 608(a). Id.
32. I have chosen in this case and in some others to protect the full identity of the
defendants, based upon their crimes and, in some cases, what I say about them. Cf Graham
Brown, Should Law Professors Practice What They Teach?, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 316, 340-41
(2005) (discussing when a teacher might feel compelled to use pseudonyms or initials in telling
war stories to avoid embarrassing or upsetting the individuals involved).
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fraud; the theory of the case was that they had siphoned nearly a million
dollars in cash out of their business over a three year period without paying
taxes on it. My main witness in the case was Gary S., Suzanne's brother and
the general manager of the company during the time in question. Gary
testified under a grant of immunity that he assisted Richard and Suzanne in
doctoring the books and was rewarded with a relatively small amount of
unreported cash for his efforts.
The prosecution's case rested heavily on Gary's credibility, a fact of which
the defense was keenly aware. The defense's theory of the case-and a very
plausible one, at that-was that Gary had in fact stolen the entire million
dollars from the company himself and was now shifting the blame to his sister
and brother-in-law to cover up his crime and obtain immunity. I knew that this
was a case that I could lose, particularly in light of the "reasonable doubt"
standard.
As is common in white collar cases, Richard and Suzanne were upstanding
citizens of their community with no prior criminal records. Thus, the main
tactic during the defense case-in-chief was to line up dozens of witnesses to
testify to their honest characters pursuant to FRE 404(a). I describe to the
students how painful it was to sit through this testimony. I had no cross-
examination with which to counter it-aside from being alleged tax cheats,
Richard and Suzanne were upstanding citizens. Of course, by this time the
class has already studied character evidence, so they can relate to what I was
facing in court.
Then I tell the students that, as I was sitting in the courtroom, I realized
that the character witnesses who knew Richard and Suzanne well enough to
testify on their behalf must also know Gary. I thought to myself that these
witnesses might very well have something good to say about Gary, too. I
describe to the students how, while the second or third character witness was
testifying, I started flipping furiously through my evidence rulebook trying to
find the rule-which I could only vaguely recall-that would allow me to ask
these people about Gary. Of course, I came across FRE 608(a).
By this time, we have studied cross-examination, including the "rule" that
you should never ask a question on cross examination to which you do not
already know the answer. I did not know who the defense character witnesses
were, let alone what they would say about Gary. I ask the students what they
think my course of action should have been. This is a very practical question,
and even after some discussion, the students are usually unable to come up
with a good answer. I then tell them what I, in fact, did: whispering at counsel
table, I asked the IRS case agent to go out into the hall and conduct quick
interviews of all of the character witnesses lined up to testify. I instructed him
to ask them (1) if they knew Gary S.; (2) how well; and (3) what opinion they
had regarding his character for truthfulness. The agent dutifully undertook this
inquiry.
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A witnesses or two later, the agent came back in to the courtroom and
whispered to me that all of the witnesses outside knew Gary well, liked him,
and thought that he was an honest person. After all, most of them had dealt
directly with Gary in his role as general manager more than they had ever dealt
with either Richard or Suzanne. Armed with this information, my plan was
set.
After the next character witness testified to Richard and Suzanne's good
citizenship, I asked to inquire on cross-examination. I asked the witness if he
knew Gary S. The witness answered affirmatively. I asked the witness how he
knew Gary. At this point, the defense vociferously objected, and the judge
called us to side bar.
Recognizing the obscurity of FRE 608(a), I describe to the students how I
approached side-bar armed with my rulebook opened to the right page. When
the defense objected to my line of questioning, I handed the judge the book,
pointed to the rule and argued that, since they had forcefully attacked Gary's
credibility on cross examination, I was allowed to rehabilitate his character for
truthfulness through good character witnesses. When the judge started to nod
his approval, the defense responded (with admirable agility) that my inquiry
about Gary's character was outside the scope of direct examination, which had
been limited to the character of Richard and Suzanne. The judge turned to me
for a response. At this point, I consult with the class. We agree that this
"outside the scope" objection is technically accurate.
By this time, the students are riding this doctrinal roller-coaster with me.
We've already studied FRE 611. I ask them to turn to the rule while I provide
them with my response to the objection. "Your honor," I said, "Counsel is
correct that my examination is outside the scope. However, you have the
discretion under FRE 611 to control the order of the witnesses to 'avoid
needless waste of time' and protect witnesses from 'harassment.' Of course,
we could excuse all of these witnesses today and then drag them all back in to
testify as character witnesses for Gary during the prosecution's rebuttal case.
But they're here, now. Why inconvenience these fine citizens for no good
reason? While they're already on the stand, let them complete their testimony
and go home."
With a gleam in his eye (or at least that's how I remember it), the judge
ruled in my favor. The next two or three character witnesses all vouched for
Gary's truthfulness on cross-examination. I stress to the class how devastating
it was to the defendants to have their own witnesses bolstering the credibility
of the main witness against them. I recall for the students how, after a few
witnesses had testified this way, the defense--completely shaken-asked for a
recess for the remainder of the court day, even though it was only about 4 in
the afternoon.
The war story does not end there. When court convened the next morning,
some of the same character witnesses were waiting in the hall to be called. I
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thought this was odd considering the events of the prior afternoon. In any
case, the first of these witnesses took the stand and testified for Richard and
Suzanne. Then I proceeded to cross. When I asked the witness whether he
knew Gary, his answer was equivocal. When I asked if he had an opinion
about Gary's character for truthfulness, he replied that no, he really did not
have an opinion one way or the other. Then I started down the path of
impeachment based on witness preparation-a topic the class has already
studied. I asked the witness if he recalled speaking to the IRS agent sitting
next to me in the hall the day before. He answered affirmatively. I asked if he
remembered telling the agent that he believed Gary to be a truthful person. He
admitted so stating. Then I asked the question that put an end to any more
character witnesses taking the stand for the defense: "Isn't it true, sir, that what
caused you to change your view of Gary between yesterday afternoon and this
morning was a meeting you had with defense counsel in which he suggested
that you not be helpful to me on cross-examination?" I don't recall the
witness's answer, but the point was made.
Through this story, I firm up the class' understanding of impeachment and
rehabilitation. They also learn a lesson about how, in trying to fix a mistake,
trial lawyers sometimes make matters much worse.
E. Use Unfavorable War Stories: Ones in Which You Made a Mistake, Were
One-upped by the Other Side, or Fell Flat on Your Face
Nobody likes a braggart, including law students. If a professor only tells
stories about his moments of glory, the students may learn, but they'll probably
also learn not to like the storyteller very much. Nothing is more powerful in
terms of preserving humility, humanity, and credibility in front of the
classroom than using illustrations from practice in which you made a
mistake-small, large, or in-between. Indeed, the saying goes that we learn
the most from our mistakes; a corollary is that others can learn a lot from our
mistakes as well.
In teaching Evidence, I employ at least three stories from my experience in
which I made a costly mistake. The first one is quite simple, but it drives
home an important point. It stems from my role as lead counsel in United
States v. Theodoropoulos,33 a prosecution targeting a cocaine distribution ring
allegedly involving members of the "Greek Mafia" in Philadelphia. The story
comes up after we have studied FRE 404(a), the prohibition against use of
character evidence for the propensity inference and its exceptions for criminal
cases, FRE 404(a)(1) & (2). The students have learned that the "key" to the
character evidence "door" rests with the defendant; he can choose to unlock
the door and put his character in issue, or to keep character out of the case
altogether. Often, at some point in this discussion, a student will ask
33. 866 F.2d 587 (3d. Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 50:1191
THE EFFECTIVE USE OF WAR STORIES IN TEACHING EVIDENCE
something along the lines of, "What's the big deal? Surely this kind of
evidence is of marginal use to criminal defendants."
34
That's when I tell my Theodoropoulos story. As a young prosecutor, I,
too, thought that good character evidence was a basic waste of time-until my
experience in Theodoropoulos. The prosecution culminated in a multi-week
trial against six or seven defendants. The main evidence consisted of wire-taps
during which the various defendants made arrangements to buy and sell
cocaine, using a very unsophisticated code. One defendant, "John," was
caught on tape on numerous occasions participating in these conversations, and
co-conspirators also talked about John's participation in the business. My case
against John was as strong as my case against any of the other "secondary"
players in the conspiracy.
John owned a coffee shop in downtown Philadelphia. Prior to the defense
case, counsel for John told me that a Philadelphia police officer who had
frequented John's coffee shop for years was prepared to testify as a character
witness for John. He asked me whether I would stipulate to the police officer's
good character testimony "to avoid the inconvenience of having to subpoena a
cop during his shift." I considered the offer, and decided that I did not want a
police officer, likely dressed in full uniform, to testify to a defendant's good
character. Thus, I agreed to the stipulation. The jury was told of the parties'
agreement that, if called as a witness, Police Officer "So and So" would testify
that John was a law-abiding citizen.
When the verdict came back, most of the other defendants were
convicted-except John. I concluded that John's acquittal had to have resulted
from the character evidence, because that was the only thing setting him apart
from his convicted counterparts. I also concluded that I was likely duped: who
knows whether, if I had refused the stipulation, a Philadelphia police officer
would actually have shown up in federal court to vouch for an accused drug
dealer. From this experience, students learn (1) that character witnesses can
turn the tide in a close case and (2) one should be reasonable but also very
careful about agreeing to stipulations proposed by the other side.
My second tale of courtroom disaster comes after we have studied
impeachment and rehabilitation, including impeachment based upon witness
preparation.35  I pause at this point for a "Professional Responsibility
Moment," reviewing witness preparation that is considered ethical (but always
subject to inquiry on impeachment) and witness preparation that is unethical. I
preach to the students that they should always stay on the right side of this line
and, equally important, always tell their witnesses that they are playing by the
rules. Thus, if a witness is asked.on cross-examination whether she met with
Mr. Seigel to review her testimony prior to trial, she should know that in this
34. If a student fails to raise the issue, of course, I do it myself.
35. See, e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
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instance, as in all others, she should tell the truth, and the truthful answer is
"yes."
To drive the point home, I resort to a war story involving another Sicilian
witness from the Gambino trial whom I will refer to as "FR." A lifelong
heroin dealer, and who knows what else, FR was one of the most sleazy
individuals I ever had to prepare for the witness stand. He simply did not
understand what it meant to play by the rules and appeared to assume, always,
that our "surreptitious" meetings to prepare his testimony were our little secret.
I drove home to him, over and over again, that everything I was doing was
above board and that he should answer all questions, including questions about
our meetings, as truthfully as he could based on his recollection.
At trial, FR testified on direct and then cross, and far exceeded my
expectations as a witness. All of my work preparing him had paid tremendous
dividends. And then I was handed what I thought to be a gift from the
litigation gods: FR's cross-examination was completed at the end of a court
day. He was turned back over to me for redirect in the morning. I would thus
have a chance to prepare a redirect examination; a rare luxury in trial practice.
The next morning I met with FR and an agent in a room next to the
courtroom. I told FR that I had three questions for him, and depending upon
what his answers were, I might or might not ask him these questions on the
witness stand. I asked my questions and was satisfied with the answers. Thus,
I told FR that I would call him back to the stand for a very brief redirect
examination.
I asked my three questions in the courtroom and FR gave his answers. By
how smoothly this redirect went (e.g., I did not need to lead my witness, a
common problem in redirect examinations), lead defense counsel essentially
knew that it had been prepared. With tremendous theatrical flair, summoning
up horrendously accusatory tones in his voice, defense counsel asked FR
whether he had met with me to review his testimony since his appearance in
the courtroom the previous afternoon. FR was fooled into thinking that he
(we!) had done something terribly wrong, and flat out denied meeting with me.
Thus, I now had a witness on the stand that I knew to be committing perjury.
After a few more questions, defense counsel leaned over to me and, in a
stage whisper asked, "He's lying, isn't he?" Mortified, I nodded yes. Defense
counsel said, "Do something about it." Luckily, I had the presence of mind to
know that standing up in front of the jury and declaring my witness to be a liar
was not the only option I had to rectify his perjury. So, I whispered back to my
opponent, "When you're done with him, I'll fix it."
After an excruciatingly painful re-cross-examination, I stood up for re-
redirect. At this time, I proceeded to impeach my own witness, getting him to
admit that we had, in fact, met that very morning to review my questions and
his answers. I'll never forget the look on his face while I was questioning him;
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it communicated something like, "You idiot, I just saved your career by
covering for you, and now you're mining it."
Thus, through this disaster, I teach my students about the importance of
always playing by the rules; of the need for constant repetition when
conducting witness interviews and preparation; of how to rectify perjury
without destroying one's case; and how, sometimes, it's just better to quit
while you're ahead.
I employ yet a third negative personal experience when teaching about the
use of expert witnesses pursuant to FREs 702, 703, 704, and 705. In this
instance, my role was not as litigator but as the expert-so my tale is told from
the perspective of the (lawyer) witness. The experience provides the students
with a number of useful insights into the use of experts at trial.
As with most of the previously described war stories, I do not tell this one
until the students have grappled with the expert witness rules a bit on their
own. Then I tell them about my one and only experience as a testifying expert.
The case was a civil lawsuit against a small town outside of Gainesville,
Florida, and its police chief, brought by an individual who had spent several
months in jail for a murder (which had taken place twelve years prior to his
arrest) that he claimed he did not commit. The defendant's accuser was his ex-
wife, who claimed just prior to a child custody hearing that he had confessed to
the murder many years earlier. Based on the ex-wife's statement (and
essentially nothing else), the defendant was arrested. Plaintiff's claim was
false arrest-that he was arrested without probable cause. Indeed, as soon as
the prosecutor learned of the custody dispute and the wife's use of her ex-
husband's arrest as the basis for her claim to custody of their children, he
dismissed the murder charges.
In his defense, the police chief claimed that the prosecutor had duly
authorized the original arrest warrant. I was hired as an expert "on the
relationship between the police and prosecution" and was prepared to state my
opinion that this defense was flawed because the police chief had failed to tell
the prosecutor about the child custody dispute when initially presenting the ex-
wife's statement as the basis for probable cause. I was also prepared to state
my opinion that, in light of that dispute and the absence of any other evidence,
no probable cause existed for the arrest.
I explain to the students how the process of expert testimony works: first,
plaintiff's counsel put me on the stand, asked me about my qualifications, and
then tendered me as an expert under FRE 702.36 The judge asked the defense
if it had any objection. The defense asked to inquire and was granted the
opportunity to conduct a voir dire regarding my qualifications. This is where
the story gets interesting.
36. Actually, it was a state case, so the rules used were Florida's equivalents to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
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On the one hand, my qualifications as an expert were impeccable: Harvard
Law School, Harvard Law Review, federal organized crime prosecutor, law
professor at the flagship law school in the state. But the defense came
prepared. Through their voir dire, they established that (1) I had never
prosecuted a murder case; 37 (2) I had never prosecuted a case of any kind in
Florida; (3) I was not even a member of the Florida Bar; (4) I had never
consulted with any police agencies on any matters, including matters regarding
arrest and probable cause; and (5) I had never set foot in the town in question.
In short, they painted me as an "egg-head" Ivy League interloper who was
daring to second guess the judgment of their own long-standing, hard-working
chief of police, who truly understood the terrain on which he toiled. At the end
of this excruciating voir dire, the defense announced that it had no objection to
me as an expert witness in the area for which I had been tendered.
It was a brilliant bit of lawyering. From it, the students learn that true facts
are often what lawyers make of them; they learn that what is seen as a
tremendous advantage (e.g., my Harvard degree) can be turned into a
tremendous disadvantage; and more specifically, they learn that voir dire can
be used to discredit an expert witness before that witness has had a chance to
testify about his opinions. By the time the defense in this case had completed
their voir dire, the remainder of my direct testimony was essentially worthless.
Finally, the students learn a bit of strategy: by not objecting to me as an expert,
the defense scored its points during voir dire without suffering the certain
overruling of an objection (I was without doubt technically qualified), which
would have at least partially undermined the effectiveness of their voir dire
attack.
F. When Appropriate, Use Humor and Be Theatrical When Telling a War
Story
Evidence classes tend to be quite large-at my school they range from 95
to 115 students. In classes of this size, it takes a great deal of energy on the
part of the teacher to keep the students consistently engaged in the material. A
dry, monotonous performance is likely to lose a lot of students to sleep and
boredom. A good war story, told in a theatrical manner, can literally shake the
class up and bring the students back to life. This is especially true, I think, if
the story involves humor and if the students, with their newly learned doctrine,
find themselves in on the joke.38
37. I had only prosecuted one federal racketeering case that included homicide among the
various racketeering acts. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
38. One must take great care, however, to ensure that the humor is good-natured and does
not come at the expense of individuals or audience members. After recounting a conference
luncheon speaker who told a humorous but extremely inappropriate war story, Professor Eileen
Scallen reports that she was "reminded, in a concrete and visceral way, that what helps my
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Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon from my teaching occurs
during the class's discussion of cross-examination. Although I warn my
students that an in-depth study of the "art of cross-examination" is beyond the
scope of our Evidence course, I also tell them that I will clue them into some of
the fundamentals of a good cross-examination. We talk about the basic "rules"
of cross, such as (1) use leading questions (unless you don't care what the
answer is); (2) don't ask for explanations; (3) don't ask a question to which
you don't already know the answer (and are prepared to impeach the witness to
get him to "fess up" the truth); and (4) don't ask "one question too many."
With our discussion of these rules complete, I tell the story of the worst (and
funniest) cross-examination I ever witnessed.
Once again, the case is Gambino.39 The witness was a bank teller who was
so minor to the case that I did not prepare his testimony until the morning of
trial and I do not remember his name. His evidence was relevant to a money
laundering charge that we had brought against Simone Zito and Tony, Grace,
and Salvatore Mannino. The basis of the charge was our tracing of some
portion of $25,000 that we (the government) had paid to the defendants for
heroin, through the bank account of Tony's Pizza, and then to the down
payment on a condominium. The teller was merely a custodial witness; he
testified on direct that $16,000 in cash deposits were made into the bank
account of Tony's Pizza on a particular day, which happened to be a day or
two after the heroin transaction.
Salvatore Mannino's counsel, whom I shall refer to only as EF, got up to
conduct the cross-examination for the defense. Clearly, this was a "seat-of-
the-pants" cross: EF, a very experienced (and generally very good) trial lawyer
had not thought about it until the witness was testifying on direct.
Nevertheless, the beginning of the cross went well enough. Through the
witness, EF established that pizzerias are cash businesses and that the majority
of the deposits made into the Tony's Pizza bank account over the years had
been cash deposits. He further established that some of these deposits had
been quite large. At this point, I tell my class, EF should have sat down. He
had done what he could on cross: negate the unfavorable inferences the
government was trying to draw from the $16,000 cash deposit made on that
particular day.
But EF was on a roll--or so he thought. He asked, "So there was nothing
unusual then, about this $16,000 deposit, was there?" Immediately, many
students become better at the use of [e]vidence is to teach them to think-to think carefully not
only about what they say, but also what they should say and how they should say it." Eileen A.
Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, Teaching
and Ethics, 21 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 813, 886 (2003).
39. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text for my first reference to United States v.
Gambino, 728 F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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students recognize this as the classic one question too many. The witness
answered, "Oh no, Mr. F, this was a very unusual deposit for Tony's Pizza."
Now I ask the students, what should EF have done at this point? They shout
out, nearly unanimously, "Sit down!",40 But EF did not sit down. Instead,
curiosity got the better of him, and he could not imagine getting outsmarted by
a lowly bank teller. So, he asked, "Well tell us, [Mr. Bank Teller], what was
so unusual about this particular deposit?"
The students start to laugh as they realize that EF had just violated two
more rules of cross examination: he'd asked for an explanation, and he'd asked
a question to which he did not know the answer. Then, I recall the answer.
"Well, Mr. F, I don't know about you, but I sure don't pay for my pizzas with
$100 bills. But most of this $16,000 deposit was in $100 bills." This was
stated in all innocence-and was something I had not thought to ask about on
direct examination!
At this point, I make a swinging motion with my fist toward my face,
indicating that EF had just been sucker-punched. I begin staggering around the
front of the classroom. EF had dug himself into a hole too deep to stay in, so
he began looking for a way to climb out. The testimony continued
approximately as follows:
EF (with venom): Well, Mr. Bank Teller, you never bothered to report
this so-called unusual transaction to the supervisor
at your bank, did you?
BT (pure innocence): As a matter of fact, I did. We had a policy that all
cash transactions over a certain amount had to be
reported, and I certainly reported this one to my
supervisor.
EF: Well, Mr. Bank Teller, you didn't make a paper
record of this supposed report, did you?
BT: As a matter of fact, I did. According to bank policy,
such a written report was required, and I filled one
out.
EF: Well, Mr. Bank Teller, you didn't bring this report
to the courtroom here today so that the jurors could
see it for themselves, did you?
BT: As a matter of fact, Mr. F, I did. (Witness reaches
down to briefcase he has brought with him to the
40. In fact, I explain to the students that he should have retreated to safe territory with a
question such as, "But cash deposits for the pizzeria were not unusual, as you already testified,
correct?" And then he should have sat down.
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witness stand, opens it up and pulls out a piece of
paper. He leans toward EF.) Here it is.
EF: No further questions, your honor.
By this time, the class is roaring with laughter. I assure them that this is a
true story, that I had no idea there was a written report, but that I was sure to
introduce it into evidence on re-direct examination.
III. CONCLUSION
There are many ways to teach any law course successfully, including
Evidence. It can be approached from a very theoretical perspective or a very
practical one. Some professors still use the tried and true case method, while
others have moved more toward a problem-oriented approach. Others use
movie clips to illustrate important points. A minority of professors have even
adopted a NITA approach, essentially teaching Evidence through Trial
Practice. This Essay does not advocate any particular method for teaching
Evidence. It does take the position, however, that if an Evidence professor has
some practical experience, he or she would be well advised to make use of that
experience in the classroom. Done well-following the guidelines set out
above-the use of war stories permits the integration of theory with practice
that, in my experience, creates an excellent opportunity for enthusiastic
classroom learning.
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APPENDIX
EVIDENCE
PROFESSOR SEIGEL
SUPPLEMENTAL ASSIGNMENT:
United States of America v. Nicodemo Scarfo
Background: In 1988, Nicodemo Scarfo and sixteen other
individuals were indicted in Philadelphia on charges of
racketeering, 18 U.S.C. S 1961-63. Scarfo, alleged to be the
"Boss" of the Philadelphia family of "La Costra Nostra," was
accused in one of the racketeering acts of participating in the
murder of a federal judge (Edwin Helfant).
The Memorandum: The memorandum that follows was prepared
during the first week of what turned out to be a four-month
trial. It was written in response to what had occurred in court
that day. Kenneth McNair was called as a witness by the
government and testified as outlined in the memorandum. The
defense objected to the testimony on the grounds of relevancy and
asked that it be stricken from the record. The judge struck part
of McNair's testimony immediately; he then recessed the trial and
said that he would rule the next morning on whether the remainder
of the testimony would be stricken as well. The memorandum was
written during the night and presented to the judge before the
trial was reconvened the next morning.
Ouestions: After you read the memorandum, ask yourself the
following questions:
(1) What is the government's theory that McNair's
testimony about the gun is relevant?
-- What is the "fact of consequence" which
McNair's testimony makes more or less probable?
-- How would you chart the chain of inferences
implicitly relied upon by the government to get from McNair's
testimony about the gun to the fact of consequence?
(2) Are you convinced that the government's argument
passes the hurdle of FRE 401?
(3) Could you make an argument that the relevancy of
McNair's testimony is conditional upon proof of some other fact
(under FRE 104(b))? Would a 104(b) argument be a good strategy
for the defense?
(4) What about the 403 issue? If you were defense
counsel, how would argue that the testimony concerning the gun
amounted to unfair prejudice?
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(5) What do you suppose was the government's original
theory that McNair's testimony about his earlier lies was
relevant (see footnote 1)? How did the change in McNair's
testimony affect the relevancy of the prior lies? Was the
court's decision to strike.the testimony correct?
(6) Note that the government does not ask the judge to
reconsider its earlier ruling regarding McNair's lies. So what
was the point of writing footnote I?
(7) The memorandum was ghost-written by an attorney
who was not a member of the team prosecuting the case. Who was
the ghost?
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Crim. No. 88-00003
NICODEMO SCARFO. et al.
GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON RELEVANCE
OF TESTIMONY OF KENNETH McNAIR
On Friday, September 30, 1988, the government called
Kenneth McNair to the witness stand. McNair testified that
Government Exhibit No. 2, a Smith and Wesson .38 caliber
Airweight Revolver, serial number 3238283 -- identified as the
murder weapon in the slaying of Judge Edwin Helfant (Racketeer-
ing Act One in the Indictment) -- was at one time in his
possession. He testified that he traded the gun to Jerome
Palumbo in approximately 1975. and that he knew Jerome Palumbo
had a brother named John. He further stated that, when he was
questioned by the police about the gun shortly after the
Helfant murder, he lied in order to protect Palumbo. McNair
testifiid that he believed that Palumbo knew he lied, but he
answered "no" when asked if Palumbo had asked him to lie. On
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motion of the defense, McNair's testimony regarding the motiva-
tion for his lying was striken from the record.1
The government's evidence will show that Jerome Palumbo's
brother John was a close associate of:defendant NICODEMO SCARFO
1During the course of a side-bar proffer as to this
witness's testimony, the government represented that he would
state that Jerome Palumbo had asked him to lie to the police.
The government's representation was fully supported by McNair's
previous statements, including a sworn statement he gave to the
New Jersey State Police on January 29, 1987 (relevant portions
of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A). On that occasion
McNair testified that he had lied to the police because he "was
mostly covering up for the guy that I sold it to." Ex. A at
16. He further stated that he had spoken to Jerome Palumbo
prior to talking to the police and had assured him that "I got
a line for them." Ex. A at 17. Palumbo was "shook up" and was
going off the "bad end.". He told McNair "something like be
cool, be cool or something like that there." Ex. A at 32-33.
Palumbo accompanied McNair to the police barracks. Ex. A at
21-22. McNair told the police that he had sold the gun to
Randy Frison because Frison was dead and "a dead man can't
talk." During a pre-trial interview with a prosecutor, McNair
answered in the affirmative when asked if Palumbo had asked
that he cover for him.
MHcNair was ultimately prosecuted in connection with his
ossession of this gun, see Ex. A at 28-29, and he is a close
riend of the Palumbo fa-- y. See Ex. A at 16. It is thus not
surprising that, at trial, he re-treated from his previous
testimony regarding Palumbo's involvement in McNair's initial
mistruths.
The government notes that McNair is not the only
potentially hostile witness likely to be called during the
course of the government's case. A hostile witness may be
asked leading questions, see Fed. R. Evid. 611(c), and may even
be impeached by the party-calling the witness. See Fed. R.
Evid. 607.
In the instant case, the government chose not to impeach
McNair regarding his prior inconsistent statements because the
participation or knowledge of Jerome Palumbo regarding McNair's
prior lies is not necessary to establish the relevance of
McNair's testimony regarding the gun. See text.
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and other members of LA COSA NOSTRA. the alleged RICO enter-
prise.
The defense has vigorously challenmed the relevancy of
McNair's testimony and future evidence concerning John Palumbo.
For the reasons stated below, the government submits that this
evidence is relevant and should be admitted.
The starting point for any discussion of relevancy in the
federal courts is Fed. R. Evid. 401. which states:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having
N tendency to make the existence of an fact
taItis consequence to the determination o
the action more Pnobable than it would be without
the evidence.
(Emphasis added.) This is a "'rather liberal standard' .
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has the slightest
bit of probative worth; only evidence that has no value as
proof of a consequential fact is irrelevant." 22 C. Wright &
K. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure S 5165 at 49
(1978 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
In McQueeny v. Wilmington Trust Company, 779 F.2d 916 (3d
Cir. 1985). the Third Circuit examined the parameters of Rule
401 at some length. The court noted that the rule defines as
relevant "evidence that has 'any tendency' to make a difference
in the case." Id. at 922. It stated: "The plain meaning of
the Rule demonstrates that the scope of relevant evidence is
intended to be broad, and the authorities support such a broad
reading. See United States v. Clifford, 704 F.2d 86, 90 (3d
Cir. 1983); United States v. Steele. [685 F.2d 793, 808 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982)]t Carter v. Hewitt,
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617 F.2d 961, 966 (3d Cir. 1980) ('It]he standard of relevance
established by the Federal Rules of Evidence is not high')."
Id.
Careful analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that
the proffeved evidence in this case is relevant under the
standard set forth in Rule 401. Government Exhibit 2 ",a .38
caliber Smith and Wesson revolver, has been identified as the
murder weapon in the elfant slaying. The government has
alleged (in Racketeering Act One) that this gun was used by
defendants NICODEMO SCARFO and NICHOLAS VIRGILIO to commit the
murder. Kenneth-McNair testified that he gave this very gun to
Jerome Palumbo prior to the Helfant murder, and that Jerome
Palumbo is the brother of John Palumbo. The government's
evidence will show that, contemporaneous with the Helfant
murder, John Palumbo was an associate of NICODEMO SCARFO and
other members of LA COSA NOSTRA. This evidence certainly has a
"tendency" to make "more probable" the allegation in the
indictment. It therefore passes the Rule 401 test. Cf. United
States v. Arnott, 704 F.2d 322, 325-26 (6th Cir. 1983) (weapons
seized from co-conspirator's residence, in light of evidence
that defendant visited this residence, relevant to distribution
of cocaine charge as "tools of trade"); United States v.
Stewart, 579 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir.)-(shotgun found in stolen
car used in bank robbery relevant even without proof that it
was same as one used in robbery and seen in possession of
defendant),.cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
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The defense'argument is that this evidence is too remotely
circumstantial to be admissible. This is not, in reality, an
argument as to the relevance of the evidencer it is an argument
that the evidence does not (or should not) carry much weight.
"[Tihe judge may not consider the weight of the evidence in
determining relevance . . . the weight of the evidence is for
the jury to determine . . " 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Jr.,
Federal Practice and Procedure 5 5165 at 50 (1978 & Supp.
1987).
Of course, not all relevant evidence is admissible.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403, relevant evidence "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
The government submits that the probative value of the prof-
fered evidence is not outweighed by any of the factors enumer-
ated in Rule 403. The defense may attempt to characterize this
evidence as "prejudicial"; such an argument should be rejected.
The evidence is "prejudicial" -- i.e., it harms defendants'
case -- precisely because it is relevant. "'[UInfair
prejudice' as used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with
testimony simply adverse tO the opposing partyi Virtually all
evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice
must be 'unfair."' Dollar v. Long Hfg.. N.C. Inc., 561 F.2d
613, 618 (5th CIr. 1977); see McQueeny, 779 F.2d at 923. There
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Is nothing unfair about the evidence the government proposes to
introduce, and thus it should be admitted during trial.
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